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
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
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Guyana: Cabinet crisis is coming to a head. (Page 5)




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Spain: Possible cabinet shifts (Page 6)



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HANOI AREA - Bridge and Rail Ferry Bypass System



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23 Sep 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

*Vietnam:

North Vietnam: The Canal des Rapides Rail and Highway Bridge, an important link on North Vietnam's main route to China damaged by US bombing raids six weeks ago, is again open to rail and truck traffic.

Supply trains from China can now travel as far south as the Red River, on the outskirts of Hanoi, where repairs on the damaged Doumer Bridge are still not complete. Recent aerial photography shows that the highway portion of this bridge has been reopened for limited truck traffic. (Map)

South Vietnam: Action in the ground war is centered on the area just below the Demilitarized Zone.


More than 650 rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire--a record for the Communists in a 24-hour period--struck the Marine outpost at Con Thien and a nearby field position on 21 September. Sixteen Americans were killed and over 200 wounded in the bombardment and in a small-unit clash just south of Con Thien.

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23 Sep 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

USSR-Japan: The Soviet Union's indication that it is willing to discuss the return of Japan's former "northern territories" probably is designed to generate increased Japanese pressure on the Okinawa issue.

The Soviet retention of four islands north of Hokkaido among the territory it seized at the end of World War II has been the most contentious issue between Moscow and Tokyo, and the main obstacle to a peace treaty.

The Soviet ambassador in Tokyo recently informed the Japanese that Moscow would be willing to take up the subject during the Soviet-Japanese talks on fisheries scheduled to take place in Moscow in November. According to the Japanese Foreign Office, Japan's tactics in the talks have not yet been decided. Initially Tokyo may take the line of asking for the early return of all four islands.

There is nothing to indicate that the Soviets are now genuinely interested in a final settlement, after many years of refusing to discuss the issue. Moscow may have decided that a suggestion of flexibility will stimulate public pressure on Prime Minister Sato--who will be in Washington at about the time of the Moscow talks--to stiffen his position on the status of Okinawa.

The Japanese are, of course, anxious to explore the apparent shift in the Soviet position. While they may not expect any immediate Soviet concessions on the territorial issue, they will be encouraged to press the Soviets to grant them expanded fishing rights.

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Guyana: The three-week-long cabinet crisis may come to a head soon.

Finance Minister D'Aguiar, the leader of the smaller coalition party, the United Force, is threatening to resign. At issue is a political appointment by Prime Minister Burnham. The dispute has escalated into a head-on confrontation, and prospects for an amicable settlement are bleak.

In what is almost certainly a bluff to keep D'Aguiar and the two other ministers of his party in the government, Burnham is also threatening to resign and turn the government over to pro-Communist opposition leader Cheddi Jagan.

D'Aguiar's resignation, which is far more likely than Burnham's, would not by itself topple the government. His departure would, however, weaken the confidence of the local and international business community in the government. It would also increase the possibility of his party's legislators allying with Jagan's to vote down controversial government legislation.

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
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
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NOTES

Spain: Foreign Minister Castiella may be on his way out of the cabinet. Castiella was not among those cabinet members appointed on 20 September by Franco to the elite National Council. The omission of Castiella and other cabinet members is viewed by contacts of the US Embassy in Madrid as foreshadowing their replacement later this year. If Franco removes Castiella, it may be with a view to "enhancing" Spain's position in negotiations with Britain regarding Gibraltar.

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